Problem of the Criterion

Hi, this is Bo Dong.


Thought it would be appropriate to get the discussion going by introducing everyone to the problem of the criterion.

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Understanding the Problem

Roderick Chrisholm outlines the problem through the following two questions.

(1) What can we know?

(2) What are the criteria of knowledge?

Question (2) should not look unfamilar. It's the same question that we've been trying to answer all through Term 1 (and up to now), i.e. what qualifies as knowledge?

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In trying to develop a criterion for knowledge,

a. one is likely to identify instances in which people know (e.g. the weatherman who knows that it will rain tomorrow).

b. From these numerous instances, he will then identify a consistent thread or pattern linking all these instances of people knowing.

c. That very pattern will then constitute his criterion for knowledge.

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Now, if you've recognized that (a) actually commits the fallacy of begging the question, then you're on the right track. Allow me to explain. How does one identify instances in which people know, if he does not already possess a ready, functional and working criterion for knowledge? But clearly one lacks the criterion for knowledge, for that was the very reason we decided to identify the instances of knowledge in the first place!

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Going back to two questions raised by Chrisholm, we realise that

The answer to (1) requires the answer to (2) whereas,

the answer to (2) requires the answer to (1).

One cannot identify a criterion for knowledge if he could not identify the instances in which knowledge is found. Similarly, one cannot identify the instances in which knowledge is found if he did not possess a criterion for knowledge. This is the Problem of the Criterion.

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There exist 3 main schools of thought on the issue:

(1) Methodism (Criterion --> Instances). Answer Question (2) first, then Question (1)

(2) Particularism (Instances --> Criterion). Answer Question (1) first, then Question (2)

(3) Skepticism. If one is unable to find a suitable solution to the problem of the criterion, one is likely to find oneself in the position of having to concede to global skepticism - i.e., that we can never know.

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Miscellanous:

- Is there a different way of looking at the Problem of the Criterion? Might a criterion for knowledge be obtained some other way? (hint: a priori, introspection, doctrine of recollection etcetera)

- Is particularism less convincing than methodism for the fact that it presupposes that there were instances of knowledge to begin with?

- Does knowledge constructed suffer from the Problem of the Criterion?

- How does the Gettier problem come into the picture?

- If (according to the Problem of the Criterion), humans can never know, then how is it that justified true belief remains such a popular account of what knowledge truly is? How did we come to the understanding that knowledge is justified true belief?

Bibliography:
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/chisholm/#EpiIIOthEpiDoc http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Problem_of_the_criterion
Pritchard D. (Ed.). (2006). What is this thing called knowledge? Routledge.